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Increasing Global Demand for an
Uncensored Internet-How the
U.S. Can Help Defeat Online
Censorship by Facilitating Private
Action
ABSTRACT

This Note discusses efforts to defeat government censorship
of the Internet. In the narrow meaning of that idea, this Note
initially discusses technological efforts to circumvent
government-imposed Internet firewalls; in the broader sense, it
addresses the larger goal of inducing censoring governments to
bring their firewalls down. Proposed U.S. legislation would
provide U.S. government funding of censorship circumvention
technology. This Note discusses why such funding is not a good
approach. Absent larger internationalefforts, private actionwithin both the U.S. and censoring countries-has the best
chance of bringing down government-run firewalls. This Note
discusses how the U.S. government can best facilitate such
private action through a two-pronged approach. The approach
attempts to increase private circumvention efforts while
decreasing U.S. corporate assistance in foreign governments'
censoring. This Note argues that such an approach would
result in the possibility of censoringgovernments bringing down
their firewalls because of an increased demand for an
uncensored Internet and sufficient government frustration in
maintainingsuch censorship.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Global Internet Freedom Act of 20061 and the Global Online
Freedom Act of 20072 propose government funding of "anti-jamming"
technology that allows users in Internet-censoring countries to view

1.
2.

Global Internet Freedom Act, H.R. 4741, 109th Cong. (2006).
Global Online Freedom Act, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. (2007).
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websites that are blocked by their government. 3 U.S. government
funding of such technology is not a good long-term approach to
defeating government Internet censorship. The U.S. government
would be perceived internationally as imposing its own standards of
decency and morals onto China and other countries with similar
Internet censorship. Such criticism gains legitimacy when it is
viewed in light of the U.S. government's own restrictions on Internet
freedom regarding suspected terrorism, pornography, and content
4
deemed obscene.
The U.S. government does not permit a completely free Internet
within its own borders, yet would be actively supplanting other
5
countries' content restrictions under the proposed legislation.
Government funding of such technology contradicts the spirit of U.S.
courts' own community standards test, which allows the most
6
restrictive standard within the U.S. to govern what is decent online.
Funding of technology that circumvents foreign censorship amounts
to a statement that while the most restrictive standard in the U.S. is
an important consideration, the most restrictive standards abroad
must be torn down. Given that the U.S. has included its own content
filters in such software offerings in the past, 7 the U.S. would
essentially be replacing another government's firewall with its own.
This Note proposes that the U.S. government should not fund
anti-jamming software, but should rather take an approach that
would better facilitate private action to defeat Internet censorship.
This suggested approach includes (1) allowing anonymization
websites that are aimed at circumventing government censorship to
operate with minimal U.S government involvement, and (2)
attempting to minimize U.S. corporate assistance in foreign
governments' censorship efforts. This Note will discuss the history of
Internet censorship in China and other censoring countries, critically
analyze the Global Internet Freedom Act and Global Online Freedom
Act, outline a better approach, and discuss how the advocated
approach would promote breaking government-imposed firewalls
from within Internet-censoring countries.

3.
The Global Internet Freedom Act explicitly calls for government funding of
anti-jamming software, while the Global Online Freedom Act simply implies that such
funding is likely. See infra Part III.B.
4.
See infra Part III.D-E.
5.
See infra Part III.D.
6.
See infra Part III.E.
7.
See infra Part III.D.
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION

A. An Overview of CensorshipMethods
The 2002 House policy statement supporting the original Global
Internet Freedom Act, entitled "Tear Down This Firewall," states that
the "most notorious violators of Internet freedom" are Cuba, Laos,
8
North Korea, China, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and Vietnam.
According to the report, which cites the Human Rights Watch and
Reporters Without Borders, the control methods used by these
governments include "denying their citizens access to the Internet,
censoring content, banning private ownership of computers, and even
making e-mail accounts so expensive that ordinary people cannot use
them."9 The blocking and censoring methods are most often in the
form of government-run firewalls and filters.' 0 Some governments
also monitor individual activity, for example, screening for certain
words in emails or message boards, and may "black list" individual
users or even prosecute them."
For those countries where the Internet is at least somewhat
accessible, the most widely used method of government interference
with Internet access is content censorship. 12 Content censorship is
also the method most easily defeated from abroad through the
technologies discussed in this Note. As will be discussed, as long as a
censored country's citizens have partial Internet access, it is possible
to base technology outside of the firewall or filter (abroad) that will
open up more (or all) of the Internet to users that connect to Internet
content through such foreign-run websites or programs.
Censorship is most commonly accomplished by means of proxy
servers that are interposed between the end user and the Internet.
This form of censorship is most easily implemented when the
government acts as the Internet Service Provider (ISP).13 It requires,
at a minimum, that the government have control over the country's
ISPs. 14 While the House policy statement states that the "strictest
enforcers of Internet censorship are Bahrain, China, Iran, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and Yemen,"'15 this Note will focus mostly on

8.
HOUSE POLICY COMMITTEE, POLICY STATEMENT, ESTABLISHING GLOBAL
INTERNET FREEDOM: TEAR DOWN THIS FIREWALL
(2002),, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/
20021014010556/http://policy.house.gov/html/news item.cfm?id=l12 [hereinafter TEAR
DOWN THIS FIREWALL].
9.
Id.
10.
Id.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
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China. This Note's focus on China is in line with a similar focus by
both the Global Internet Freedom Act 6 and the most prominent
17
private anti-jamming technologies.
Chinese regulation of the Internet has become increasingly strict
since the Internet began.' 8 One of the first laws came through the
"PRC [People's Republic of China] Interim Provisions of the
Regulation of Computer Networks and the Internet" in 1995.19 These
provisions' basic message was that existing state laws apply on the
Internet. 20 The interim provisions were superseded by the "PRC
Measures on the Regulations of Public Computer Networks and the
Internet" in April 1996.21 These provisions were more expansive and
tailored to the Internet, prohibiting activities like hacking and
computer viruses. 22
The provisions also began the Chinese
government's heavy reliance on self-censorship and self-regulation by
stating that citizens must report criminal activity and must cooperate
23
with government monitoring and inspection.
In 2002, the Chinese government added to its censorship arsenal
by implementing software filtering based on keywords. 24 This
software blocks certain portions of sites that are not initially blocked
by the firewall, resulting in additional access to some previously
blocked websites. 25 However, it had the negative effect of filtering
26
email by keyword, which was not censored as strongly before.
The Chinese government has arrested dozens of its citizens for
their political speech on the Internet. 27 The government has also
arrested Chinese citizens who have published newsletters promoting
freedom of information on the Internet. 28 Lin Hai testified at a
Congressional roundtable regarding his need to leave China for the
U.S. in order to continue his efforts to promote free speech after being
imprisoned for 18 months as a result of his newsletter, which

16.
See id. (stating that China "commits the most Internet abuses" and retains
control over 33.7 million Internet users).
17.
See infra Part ILA, I.B.
18.
Phil Deans, The Internet in the People's Republic of China: Censorship and
Participation,in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INTERNET IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

122, 122 (Jason P. Abbott ed., 2004).
19.
Id. at 128.
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
23.
Id. at 128-29.
24.
Jill R. Newbold, Note, Aiding the Enemy: Imposing Liability on U.S.
Corporations for Selling China Internet Tools to Restrict Human Rights, 2003 U. ILL.
J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 503, 511 (2003).

25.
Id.
26.
Id. at 512.
27.
Id. at 508.
28.
China's Cyber-Wall: Can Technology Break Through?: Roundtable Before
the Cong.-Exec. Commission on China, 107th Cong. 8 (2002) (statement of Lin Hai
Computer Scientist, Shanghai, China).

304

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 41..299

promoted such ideas. 29 Once in the United States, he worked on
30
software aimed at circumventing Chinese censorship of email.
Because the Chinese government often blocks email subscription lists
from Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and other organizations
distributing information about ways around Chinese firewalls,
providing the Chinese people with access to uncensored email ties
31
into the larger goal of access to an uncensored Internet.
Lin Hai's frustration in promoting freedom of speech from within
China is an example-particularly given his relative success after
moving to the U.S.-that individuals outside of China must be
involved in such efforts. His story also hints that the Chinese
government is not immune to buckling under pressure for change,
both from within China and abroad. Lin Hai's time in jail was
shortened due to the attention given to the matter by the media and
outside human-rights organizations. 32 This lends additional credence
to an idea put forth by Bill Xia: "[T]echnology alone will not decide
the future of China's cyber-wall, but people do. If all Chinese people
would like to obtain uncensored information, the cyber-wall will be
broken from the inside. 3 3
The Lin Hai story suggests that the Chinese government will go
after citizens who attempt to spread the word of anti-censorship
technology. The more important question for Internet freedom in
China is to what extent the government will pursue mere users of
such technology.
Under the '"Measures for Managing Internet
Information Services," made law in 2000, ISPs are required to record
every website a subscriber visits, along with the telephone number
used for access. 34 ISPs must maintain records for sixty days and
submit them to the government on demand. 3 5 Thus, the Chinese
government could at the very least look back at records once the URL
becomes known by the authorities to learn which citizens are
accessing the internationally-run sites that allow firewall
circumvention.
This threat is obviously even greater in other
countries where ISPs are under the monopoly control of the
government through state control of the telecommunications
systems.36

29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id. at 9.
32.
Id. at 8.
33.
Id. at 7 (statement of Bill Xia, President, Dynamic Internet Technology,
Inc.).
34.
Newbold, supra note 25, at 509.
35.
Id.
36.
See Philip J. Oliveri, Technology Software that Counters Internet Jamming:
Its Role in the U.S. and in Non-Democratic Countries, 2003 SYRACUSE L. & TECH. J. 5
(2003) (discussing the ways in which authoritarian governments interfere with and
restrict internet access).
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China's censorship technology is only part of its formula for
content control on the Internet; as mentioned previously, the
government also relies heavily on self-censorship resulting from the
public's fear of possible punishment.3 7 Other countries use more
direct, forceful methods of censorship. In Cuba, Fidel Castro only
38
allows Internet access through government- approved institutions,
places high taxes on email accounts, 39 and banned the sale of
personal computers to the general public in 2002.40 The Internet
essentially does not exist in North Korea because Kim Jong-Il has
41
banned access to any websites outside of the country.
Reporters Without Borders calls North Korea "by far the worst
Internet black hole. '4 2 The computers available to some students and
researchers at universities in North Korea are only connected to each
other through what is essentially a countrywide intranet. 43 The
government monitors this intranet. 44 According to the New York
Times, "[a] handful of elites have access to the wider Web-via a
pipeline through China-but this is almost certainly filtered,
monitored and logged. '4 5 Such use by one country's citizens of
another country's less strict Internet regulations will be seen in this
Note as the typical method around government firewalls and
censorship.
B. Technologies Used to Circumvent Censorship
The U.S. has directly funded some anti-jamming technology, but
46
the funding has been limited and targeted specifically at China.
According to the text of the Global Internet Freedom Act:
The United States has thus far commenced only modest steps to fund
and deploy technologies to defeat Internet jamming. To date, for
example, the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia have committed a
total of $3,000,000 for technology to counter Internet jamming of their
websites by the People's Republic of China. This technology has been
relied upon by Voice of America and Radio Free Asia to ensure access to
their programming, and it has successfully permitted 100,000 electronic
47
hits per day from users in China.

37.
Deans, supra note 19, at 122.
38.
Oliveri, supra note 38, at 6.
39.
Id. at 8.
40.
Id. at 7.
41.
Id. at 7
42.
Tom Zeller, Jr., The Internet Black Hole That Is North Korea, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2006, at C3.
43.
Id.
44.

Id.

45.
46.
47.

Id.
See Global Internet Freedom Act, H.R. 4741, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006).
Id.
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For the most part, non-governmental organizations and
individuals-many
of them
Chinese dissidents-have
been
48
responsible for the creation and costs of anti-jamming software.
The techniques have included various technological approaches,
including use of proxy servers, intermediaries, mirrored sites, and
encryption. 49 A proxy server is a computer that allows indirect
connections to other sites by taking the request, accessing the file
from the actual location, and then returning it to the user. 50 A mirror
site is a website that hosts content that is identical to that at another
location; it allows pages to be viewed without ever requesting data
51
from the original server.
1.

Examples of Anti-Jamming Software

"Triangle Boy," an anti-jamming technology developed by
SafeWeb that allowed Internet access through an encrypted channel,
was receiving millions of hits per month from China and Saudi
Arabia before closing due to lack of funding. 52 SafeWeb operated
public proxy servers that allowed users behind firewalls to access
blocked sites. 53 Triangle Boy was a separate software that "spoofed"
Internet protocol (IP) addresses and helped users connect to SafeWeb
who were unable to access the SafeWeb servers directly (such as
users in China). 54 Triangle Boy was a peer-to-peer network by which
a user behind a firewall would send a request to a second user, who in
turn would connect directly with the SafeWeb server and return the
information to the original requester. 55 A peer-to-peer arrangement
means that the more "installations" or hosts there are taking
requests, the harder it is for a business or country running a firewall
56
to block requests simply by IP address.
"Peekabooty" is a program employing a different approach to
defeat Internet jamming. 5 7 Peekabooty is essentially a peer-to-peer
network. When a user wants to access a blocked website, the

48.

Elaine M. Chen, Legislative Update - Global Internet Freedom: Can

Censorship and Freedom Coexist?, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 229, 242

(2003).
49.
Id.
50.
PC Magazine Encyclopedia, Proxy Server Definition, http://www.pcmag.
com/encyclopedia-term/O,2542,t=proxy+server&i=49892,00.asp
(last visited Nov. 5,
2007).
51.
PC Magazine Encyclopedia, Mirror Site Definition, http://www.pcmag.com/
encyclopedia term/0,2542,t=mirror+site&i=47085,00.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
52.
Chen, supra note 49.
53.
Steven Bonisteel, Voice Of America Aims to Break China's Web Site
Blockades, NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK, Aug. 30, 2001.
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57.
Chen, supra note 49, at 243.
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program uses another computer on the Peekabooty network to access
58
the website and return an encrypted version to the initial requestor.
There are also more typical peer-to-peer networks for downloading
uncensored content in China, such as Freenet-China. 59
Many
variations of the peer-to-peer structure have emerged recently, such
as Psiphon and Tor. 60 The technological differences between such
offerings aren't particularly relevant to this Note, but the growing
array of anti-jamming options is.
"Anonymizer," a for-profit website that allows anonymous
Internet browsing (primarily targeted not at overcoming censorship,
but providing privacy to users in non-censoring countries) has
entered the arena of anti-jamming technology. 61 Its "Operation: AntiCensorship" project is currently free. 62 The company has been
actively monitoring the amount of time it takes for the Chinese
government to block the site, finding that the time period is usually
more than a week. 63 When this occurs, the service simply sets up
under a new address, but the company claims that it has "other tricks
64
up its sleeve" if the government becomes quicker at blocking sites.
The company claims that it is willing to update on a daily basis and
to employ additional technology that would make it more difficult for
the Chinese government to identify and block the site. 65 The project
is currently online for Chinese citizens and a version is under
66
development for users in Iran.
2.

Recent Private Collaborative Efforts

In December 2006, four of the largest companies in Internet antijamming technologies reached an agreement to fully cooperate in
their technology and business operations.6 7 The four companies are:
World's Gate, Inc.; Dynamic Internet Technology, Inc.; the
UltraReach Internet Corp.; and Garden Networks for Freedom of

58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
See Hiawatha Bray, Beating Censorship on the Internet, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 20, 2006 (discussing Psiphon and Tor).
61.
See Sumner Lemon, Anonymizer Prepares to Battle China's Net Censors,
INFOWORLD, Apr. 4, 2006, http://www.infoworld.com/article/06/04/04/77090_HNanonymizer
prepares l.html (discussing Anonymizer's product).
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Internet Anti-Jamming Technology Companies Reach Milestone Agreement,
RED ORBIT, Dec. 18, 2006, http://www.redorbit.com/news/technologyl772439/internet_
antijamming-technology-companies.reachmilestone-agreement/index.html?source=r_
technology [hereinafter Milestone Agreement].
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Information. 68 The total number of visits to these companies' sites
has exceeded one billion. 69 Bill Xia is the president of the Dynamic
Internet Technology. 70 He said that the "[f]unding of these antiblockade tools and services, in addition to the income from various
service contracts, comes from donations and in-kind contributions in
different forms from people from all walks of life."' 71 He added that
many of the employees of these companies work on a volunteer
72
basis.
In order to help operate with limited funding, these companies
are now hoping that websites profiting from the new Chinese
audience that anti-jamming technology creates will contribute to the
cost. 73 Although acknowledging the increasing costs of maintaining
free services, the companies believe that they will continue to find
74
funding in order to operate as long as such services are needed.
Alex Wang, vice president of World Gate, maintains that his company
"will continue [its] efforts until the information censorship inside
China completely ceases." 75 While China, as usual, is the main focus
Cuba,
of such software, the software also has users in Belarus,
76
Ethiopia, Iran, Laos, North Korea, Tunisia, and Vietnam.
C. The Global Internet Freedom Act of 2006 (GIFA)
The Global Internet Freedom Act (GIFA), most recently
introduced on February 14, 2006, failed to make it out of the House
Committee on International Relations. 77 Versions of GIFA have been
submitted to three sessions of Congress.7 8 While it has not been
introduced in the current session, GIFA continues to warrant
discussion for its frequently cited supporting policy statement, 79 and
as a prominent example of the viewpoint that the U.S government
should fund anti-jamming software.
The official stated purpose of GIFA is "[t]o develop and deploy
technologies to defeat Internet jamming."80 GIFA defines Internet
jamming as "jamming, censoring, blocking, monitoring, or restricting

68.
Id.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
75.
Id.
Id.
76.
Global Internet Freedom Act, H.R. 4741, 109th Cong. (2006).
77.
See GovTrack.us, H.R. 4741 [109th]: Global Internet Freedom Act,
78.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-4741 (last visited Nov. 4, 2007)
(setting forth the history of H.R. 4741).
79.

TEAR DOWN THIS FIREWALL, supra note 9.

80.

H.R. 4741.
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Internet access and content by using technologies such as firewalls,
filters, and 'black boxes.' '8 1 GIFA is presumably applicable to all
countries involved in Internet jamming, but specifically lists Burma,
Cuba, Iran, Laos, the Maldives, North Korea, China, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, and Vietnam.8 2 The First Amendment and Article 19 of the
United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights are cited for
support of the policy behind the bill.
The goals of GIFA include establishing an office within the
International Broadcasting Bureau devoted to countering Internet
jamming and expediting the development and deployment of antijamming technology, including funding of development in the private
sector.8 3 GIFA would create the Office of Global Internet Freedom
within the International Broadcasting Bureau, which would be
responsible for developing a "comprehensive global strategy to combat
state-sponsored and state-directed Internet jamming. '8 4 The Office
would receive appropriations of $50,000,000 per year for 2007 and
2008.85
As discussed previously, the 2002 House policy statement
entitled "Tear Down This Firewall" outlines more detailed goals for
the bill.8 6 The statement emphasizes the need for government
utilization of the technologies already in use in the private sector to
promote "global Internet freedom. '8 7 It also calls for a resolution at
the U.N. Human Rights Commission's annual meeting "condemning
all nations practicing Internet censorship and denying freedom to
access information. 8 8
D. The Global Internet Freedom Task Force (GIFT)
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice established the Global
Internet Freedom Task Force (GIFT) on February 14, 2006.89 GIFT
was established as "an internal State Department coordination group
to address challenges to freedom of expression and the free flow of
information on the Internet." 90 GIFT aims "to maximize freedom of
expression and the free flow of information and ideas, to minimize the
success of repressive regimes in censoring and silencing legitimate
debate, and to promote access to information and ideas over the

81.

84.
85.

Id. § 6.
Id. § 2.
Id. § 3.
Id. § 4.
Id.

86.

TEAR DOWN THIS FIREWALL, supra note 9.

87.
88.

Id.
Id.

82.
83.

89.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, STATE SUMMARY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FREEDOM TASK
FORCE, FACT SHEET (2006) [hereinafter FACT SHEET].

90.

Id.
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Internet."' The GIFT strategy has three priorities: (1) monitoring
Internet freedom in countries around the world; (2) responding to
challenges to Internet freedom; and (3) advancing Internet freedom
by expanding Internet access. 92
GIFT outlines the methods it plans to employ to achieve each of
the three priorities mentioned above.9 3 The "monitoring" priority is to
be achieved by expanded monitoring and reporting of abuses of
freedom of expression. 94 This information will be included in an
annual human rights report. 95 GIFT also plans to increase interim
96
embassy reporting of Internet freedom violations.
The "responding" priority is more passive than the title would
suggest. GIFT plans to achieve this priority by raising awareness
and working with international organizations. 97 The protests will be
directed to the foreign governments practicing Internet repression. 98
GIFT plans to press the Internet freedom issue in meetings with
foreign officials. 99
It also claims to "stand ready to engage
appropriately with the technology industry, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and other stakeholders in a process aimed at
developing shared principles to guide private sector activities in
restrictive economies."10 0
Under the "advancing" priority, the GIFT fact sheet essentially
outlines pre-existing government funds and projects supporting
Internet freedom causes that it expects to continue. 10 1 The fact sheet
mentions
both
government
programs
(USAID
and
the
Telecommunications
Leadership Program) and public-private
partnerships (the Digital Freedom Initiative) that have helped to
expand Internet access in developing countries. 102 The fact sheet also
includes the announcement by the State Department's Bureau for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of a $500,000 grant program
"for innovative proposals and cutting-edge approaches to combat
Internet censorship in countries seeking to restrict basic human
10 3
rights, including freedom of expression."'
As a basis for the establishment of GIFT, the fact sheet states
that "freedom of expression is a universal right."'1 4 GIFT cites in

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

101.

Id.

102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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support of this statement both the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. 0 5
GIFT claims that international law allows limited
restrictions on speech for "legitimate government purposes" such as
"national security" and "public order."'10 6 However, "repressive
regimes misuse such exceptions as a pretext to censor speech about
'10 7
democracy and human rights and suppress dissent.
E. The Role of U.S. Corporationsin China's Internet Censorship
On August 1, 2002, the Chinese government enacted legislation
requiring ISPs to self-censor their websites.' 0 8 If an ISP does not
comply, the government may shut down the websites. 10 9 Before the
legislation was enacted, many businesses and other organizations
signed a voluntary, government-sponsored "Public Pledge on SelfDiscipline for the China Internet Industry."110 This list included
some Western corporations, including Yahoo!.11 ' The pledge stated in
part that "[s]ignatories agree to refrain from producing, posting or
disseminating harmful information that may jeopardize state security
112
and disrupt social stability."
The U.S. companies that signed the pledge or otherwise censor
versions of their sites specifically for China are spending hundreds of
millions of dollars on such censorship through personnel training and
the purchasing and maintenance of equipment. 113 Complying with
China's censorship standards also presents practical difficulties for a
search engine, as the Chinese government will not give companies a
list of the government's blocked sites or keywords. 114 In order to
create the self-censored Google.cn search engine, Google set up
computers inside China to access international sites, one after
another, adding blocked sites to the search engine's own blacklist. 1 15
The costs incurred by self-censoring ISPs and websites in efforts to

105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
Newbold, supra note 25, at 510.
109.
Id.
110.
Id.
111.
Id. at 510, 513.
112.
Id. at 510.
113.
Id. at 513.
114.
See Clive Thompson, Google's China Problem (and China's Google
Problem), N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. 23, 2006 (discussing Google's difficulties in the
Chinese Market).
115.
Id. While Google mirrors the Chinese government's blacklist in Google.cn,
Google decided to continue offering Chinese users the old Google.com as well, which
"would produce uncensored search results, though controversial links would still lead
to dead ends, and the site would be slowed down and occasionally blocked entirely by
the firewall." Id.

312

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

[VOL.. 41..299

comply with China's censorship laws allow the Chinese government
to save money and resources that would otherwise be devoted to
116
developing censorship methods and policing these sites.
U.S. companies also provide China with various pieces of its
Internet filtering software: "Cisco's firewalls help the Chinese
government monitor email; Microsoft proxy servers block Web pages;
Nortel aids the Chinese government in tracking its citizens' surfing
habits; and Websense contributes sophisticated filtering and
monitoring techniques. '117 Yahoo! has even given the Chinese
118
government personal information about alleged dissidents.
On February 15, 2006, Google, Microsoft, Yahoo!, and Cisco were
called in a Congressional hearing for aiding and abetting the Chinese
government's censorship efforts." 9 House members described these
corporations' 121behavior
in
China
as
"abhorrent"'120
and
"astonishing.'
The corporations generally responded to the
accusations by stating that they believed the benefits of their actions
towards freedom of expression in the long term outweighed the
122
downsides.
Yahoo! and Google each explicitly asked the government for help
in fighting Chinese censorship. 123 Google, for instance, "urged the
State Department and the U.S. trade representative to press U.S.
1 24
concerns on censorship during talks with foreign governments."'
The companies involved in the hearing seemed to welcome U.S.
legislation that could provide U.S. companies with an excuse to give
the Chinese government for not complying with China's censorship
laws. 125 Andrew McLaughlin, Google's senior policy counsel, even

116.
Newbold, supra note 25, at 512-13.
117.
Id. at 513.
118.
Marc Gunther, Yahoo's China Problem, FORTUNE, Feb. 22, 2006, available
at http://money.cnn.com/20O6/O2/21/news/international/pluggedin fortune/.
119.
Tech Giants Defend Actions in China - Lawmakers Blast Companies as
Collaborators in Suppressing Dissent, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 15, 2006, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11347853/.
120.
Id. ('"Your abhorrent actions in China are a disgrace,' said Rep. Tom
Lantos, the top Democrat on the House International Relations Committee. 'I simply
don't understand how your corporate leadership sleeps at night."').
121.
Id. ('"Rep. Jim Leach, R-Iowa, said Google seemingly had acted 'as a
functionary of the Chinese government ....
This is astonishing."').
122.
Id. ("Microsoft's associate general counsel, Jack Krumholtz, said his
company was committed to staying in China because of the Internet's potential for
eventually allowing free access to information. 'We think the benefits far outweigh the
downside, in terms of promoting freedom of expression,' he said.").
123.
Id.
124.
Id.
125.
Id.
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suggested that "[c]ensorship should be treated as a trade barrier and
'126
be written into free-trade agreements.
F. The Global Online Freedom Act of 2007 (GOFA)
The Global Online Freedom Act (GOFA), after failing to become
law in 2006, was re-introduced on January 5, 2007.127 The bill aims
to "promote freedom of expression on the Internet" and "to protect
United States businesses from coercion to participate in repression by
authoritarian foreign governments. ' 128
In addition to findings
similar to those previously listed in GIFA and the associated policy
statement, the bill includes the finding that China's censorship
"promotes, perpetuates, and exacerbates a xenophobic-and at times
particularly anti-American-Chinese nationalism, the long-term
effect of which will be deleterious to United States efforts to prevent
the relationship between the United States and China from becoming
hostile. '129 The bill calls for a U.S. policy of using "diplomacy, trade
policy, and export controls" to promote the free flow of information on
the Internet, and deterring U.S. businesses from "cooperating with
officials of Internet-restricting countries in effecting the political
'130
censorship of online content.
GOFA would establish the Office of Global Internet Freedom in
the Department of State. 131 The Office would be appropriated fifty
million dollars for each of the fiscal years 2008 and 2009.132 The
duties funded would include the duty to "develop and ensure the
implementation of a global strategy and programs to combat statesponsored and state-directed Internet jamming by authoritarian
foreign governments."' 33 The Office would consult with technology
companies, human rights organizations, and academic experts in
order to establish "a voluntary code of minimum corporate standards
'134
related to Internet freedom.
GOFA would not allow any U.S. business to locate "any
electronic communication that contains any personally identifiable
information" within an Internet-restricting country, as designated by

126.
Anne Broache, Web Giants Ask for Feds' Help on Censorship, CNET NEWS,
Jan. 30, 2007, available at http://news.com.com/Web+giants+ask+for+feds+help+on+
censorship/2100-1028 3-6154930.html.
127.
Global Online Freedom Act, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. (2007); Global Online
Freedom Act, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. (2006).
128.
H.R. 275.
129.
Id. § 2(12).
130.
Id. § 101.
131.

Id. § 104(a).

132.
133.
134.

Id. § 104(e).
Id. § 104(b).
Id.
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the President. 135 A private right of action would be created against
any U.S. business that provides personally identifiable information to
an official of an Internet-restricting country, unless the information
was provided for legitimate foreign law-enforcement purposes as
determined by the Department of Justice. 136 GOFA would call for
increased transparency regarding search engine filtering, requiring
search engine companies to provide the Office with a list of filter
terms used to comply with foreign censorship practices. 137 Internet
content hosting services would be required to provide similar lists of
URLs that they have removed or blocked due to foreign censorship
GOFA also calls for a feasibility study on the
practices. 138
establishment of export license requirements for technology that
1 39
facilitates restrictions on Internet freedom.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Is Anti-Jamming Software a Good Approach to Defeat Censorship?
The question of whether the U.S. should fund anti-jamming
software initially requires a decision about whether even privately
The
funded anti-jamming technology is a worthwhile effort.
operation of servers that support anti-jamming technology, as
discussed above, has varying costs, depending on the nature of the
technology used. The more a system can act as a true peer-to-peer
network, the more the costs, largely consisting of the Internet
bandwidth use, can be distributed to the volunteering general public
of host users in non-censoring countries. If two systems had the same
amount of page requests from censored users, a peer-to-peer system
like Peekabooty would require less explicit operation funding than a
system like Anonymizer, which uses central servers with companyfunded bandwidth. This assumes that enough members of the noncensored public are willing to serve as host users to fulfill all the
incoming page requests; otherwise, the service would either not fully
function or require the overflow to be handled by company-funded
bandwidth.
Due to the varying operating costs of anti-jamming software and
the constantly changing technology, it is difficult to do any sort of
general cost-benefit analysis. It would be possible to determine costs
of specific programs, but quantifying the corresponding benefit would
be too speculative. To say that the benefit is confined to the actual

135.
136.
137.

Id. § 201(a).
Id. § 202.
Id. § 203.

138.

Id. § 204.

139.

Id. § 301.
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users' downloads and page views is likely shortsighted in ignoring the
possible further spread of the ideas read about on the websites
viewed. A possible effect down the line, though tenuous, might be
that a censoring government feels enough pressure from such
programs-from both domestic demand for the uncensored content
and the government's own frustrations in blocking the technologythat it takes its firewall down. This Note will discuss that possibility
further below.
B. Government Funding of Anti-Jamming Technology under
GIFA and GOFA
GIFT was established on February 14, 2006,140 the same day
that GIFA was referred to the House Committee on International
Relations. 14 1 Both rely on the same basic premise and background:
that the U.S. government should have some additional involvement
in the efforts to defeat Internet censorship. Of course, the striking
difference between GIFA and GIFT is that GIFA would appropriate
$50,000,000 per fiscal year to its established office. 142 Based on the
title of the section that includes the appropriations of funds language,
GIFA could be interpreted as stating that this money would go
143
specifically to develop and deploy anti-jamming technologies.
However, the subsection itself simply reads that the money is "to be
appropriated to the Office," with no further qualification on the use of
the funds. 14 4 Based on GIFA's various broad goals, an attempt "to
bring to bear the pressure of the free world on repressive foreign
governments,"'145 it is possible that this appropriation could be used in
efforts that only peripherally touch upon Internet jamming.
GOFA's language appropriating funds is also vague. 14 6 GOFA is
not as explicit as GIFA in regards to funding anti-jamming
technologies. Whereas GIFA's established office would be responsible
for the "development and deployment of technologies to defeat
Internet jamming,"'14 7 GOFA calls for its established office to "develop
and ensure the implementation of a global strategy and programs to

140.

FACT SHEET, supra note 91.

141.
Global Internet Freedom Act, H.R. 4741, 109th Cong. (2006).
142.
Id. § 4(e).
143.
See id. § 4 ("Development And Deployment Of Technologies To Defeat
Internet Jamming And Censorship").
144.
Id. § 4(e).
145.
Id. § 3(6).
146.
See Global Online Freedom Act, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. § 104 (2007) (stating
that the funds "are authorized to be appropriated to the Office to carry out this
section," which includes duties such as "develop and ensure the implementation of a
global strategy and programs to combat state-sponsored and state-directed Internet
jamming").
147.
H.R. 4741 § 4 ("Development and Deployment of Technologies to Defeat
Internet Jamming and Censorship").
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combat" Internet jamming. 148 While the office established by GOFA
would not be given the explicit duty to fund anti-jamming technology
in the way that GIFA would require, the office would be well within
its power to do so.
GIFT signals that the issue of Internet freedom deserves more
attention from non-censoring governments,, including the U.S.
government. 14 9 It includes the goal that the U.S. government work
with international organizations to achieve change. 150
This
commitment not to act unilaterally can be seen throughout the GIFT
strategy. 15 1 The cooperative language of GIFT stands in contrast to
the language in GIFA, which reads as a more aggressive and
unilateral effort. 152 Due to GIFA's unilateral nature and the explicit
funding of technology that circumvents foreign government's
censorship efforts, it is important to determine what its drafters
believe would be achieved through GIFA that would not be achieved
through the more passive, international approach of the already
existing GIFT.
C. GIFA's Likelihood of 'PromotingDemocracy and Freedom"
GIFA explicitly identifies one of its purposes as the promotion of
technology that "can be used to promote democracy and freedom in
countries around the world."1 63 However, promotion of democracy
may be wishful thinking on the part of GIFA's drafters. In China, a
main target of the proposed legislation, the majority of Internet users
have typically been well-educated, wealthy men in the stronger
economic regions of the country. 154 Historically, the groups with
Internet access have also tended to be proponents of Chinese

148.

H.R. 275 § 104.

149.

FACT SHEET, supra note 91.

150.
Id.
151.
Id.
Some example excerpts of such language include: "Sustained
persuasion in meetings with foreign officials: We are committed to pressing the
message on Internet freedom in official dialogues with other countries."
Id.
"Coordinating with international partners: We will work with like-minded
governments to promote Internet freedom and to press other governments to live up to
their existing international commitments regarding freedom of expression and the free
flow of information and ideas." Id. "Maintaining and expanding Internet freedom
commitments in multilateral organizations: We will work to ensure existing
international commitments to the free flow of information and freedom of expression
are upheld and replicated in appropriate international fora." Id. "We stand ready to
engage appropriately with the technology industry, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and other stakeholders in a process aimed at developing shared principles to
guide private sector activities in restrictive economies." Id.
152.
See generally H.R. 4741; FACT SHEET, supra note 92. The more aggressive
nature of GIFA can be seen in, though is not limited to, its willingness to fund software
that circumvents foreign governments' firewalls without any international cooperation.
153.
H.R. 4741 § 3.
154.
Deans, supra note 19, at 135.
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nationalism, rather than a liberal, reformist view. 155
Chinese
nationalists have frequently published anti-American and anti156
Japanese content on the Internet.
According to a July 2007 report by the China Internet Network
Information Center, the Internet in China "is still the tool of [those]
holding higher academic -degrees and has yet to be a stage for [the]
common public to understand the world. '157 China had 162 million
Internet users in June 2007 (second only to the U.S. with 211
million), 158 but the Internet penetration rate was only 12.3%
(compared to above 65% in the U.S., Japan, and Korea). 159 That
same report did, however, show trends of increasing use among lesseducated users. 160 It also states, against the historical numbers, that
Internet users in 2006-2007 "have a relatively low income," though
16 1
this is largely influenced by the high percentage of student users.
While GIFA therefore may not effectively promote democracy, as
its drafters intended, circumventing the firewall would at least make
information related to democracy more available within China.162
While it is generally difficult to know exactly what the Chinese
government censors or filters online, a 2002 study by Harvard Law
School's Berkman Center for Internet & Society found that the top
ten Google results using the keyword "equality" were all blocked, as
were eight of the top ten results for keywords "democracy China" and
"dissident China."'1 63 While studies like this likely fuel the belief of
the Act's drafters that breaking down the firewall will help to
promote democracy, availability of political speech does not
necessarily lead to spread of such ideas. For reasons such as those
164
discussed above, this may be especially true in China.

155.
156.

Id.
Id. at 137.

157.
CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFO. CTR., STATISTICAL SURVEY REPORT ON
THE INTERNET DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 18 (2007), available at http://www.cnnic.net.cn/

downloadl2007/20thCNNICreport-en.pdf.
158.
Id. at 9.
159.
Id. at 9-10.
160.
Id. at 18.
161.
Id. at 22.
162.
See China's Internet Censorship, CBS NEWS, Dec. 3,
2002,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/12/03/tech/main531567.shtml
(stating
that
Internet sites promoting democracy were among the most often blocked by the Chinese
government).
163.
Id.
164.
See Deans, supra note 19, at 135 ["[W1n practice the groups in China that
have access to the Internet have not tended to express a strong reformist view but have
instead tended to promote a strong Chinese nationalism.").
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D. The U.S. Government's Domestic Curtailmentsof Internet Freedom
One major concern with U.S. funding of software designed to
defeat foreign governments' Internet censorship is the U.S.
The Justice
government's own domestic Internet policies.
Department served subpoenas on Google, Yahoo!, AOL, and
Microsoft's MSN in 2006 seeking "a random sampling of millions of
Internet addresses cataloged in their databases, as well as for records
165
for potentially billions of searches made over a one-week period.
The Justice Department wanted the information to bolster "its
argument that Web-filtering software doesn't work. ' 16 6 This would in
turn support the government's case for upholding the Child Online
Protection Act (COPA) of 1998.167
COPA requires online distributors of "material harmful to
minors" to keep minors from viewing such content.16 8 In a 2002 case,
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union,169 the Supreme Court
upheld an injunction barring prosecutors from filing criminal cases
under COPA until after a full trial reviewing the "current
technological reality" of the state of pornography-filtering
applications. 170 The Court suggested that such a trial might prove
that filtering is more effective than a criminal statute in preventing
children from viewing pornography. 171 A U.S. district court has
subsequently held that COPA is facially, violative of the First and
Fifth Amendments. 172 However, the Supreme Court has held that
the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), which requires schools
and libraries to install filters to block content harmful to minors, is
173
constitutionally valid.
The U.S. norms on what is and isn't appropriate to view on the
Internet have been exported through the government's sponsorship of
anti-jamming software. 174 Anti-jamming technology used by the U.S.
International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), which broadcasts Voice of
America, prevents its users in Iran and China from viewing websites

165.
Maria Godoy, Google Records Subpoena Raises Privacy Fears, NATIONAL
PUBLIc RADIO, Jan. 20, 2006, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyld=5165854.
Id.
166.
167.
Id.
168.
Id.
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
169.
170.
Declan McCullagh, Supreme Court Keeps Net Porn Law on Ice, ZDNET
NEWS, June 29, 2004, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-3513-22-5251475.html.
Id.
171.
172.
ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 821 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
173.
United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003).
174.
See Declan McCullagh, Perspective: U.S. Blunders with Keyword Blacklist,
CNET NEWS, May 3, 2004, http://news.com.comI20lO-1028_3-5204405.html (discussing
the U.S. government's apparent attempt to censor content accessed by individuals
using its anti-jamming technology).
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that include certain listed keywords. 175 This was discovered through
an independent report released in 2004.176 For China, which bases
part of its firewall on blocking certain listed keywords, this amounts
to U.S. sponsorship of software that essentially replaces China's
censored keyword list with the United States' own list.
U.S.-imposed censorship is not confined to blatantly offensive
content; the list in the IBB software includes "ass" (which
inadvertently bans usembassy.state.gov), "breast" (which blocks
breastcancer.com), "hot" (which blocks hotmail.com and hotels.com)
and "teen" (which blocks teens.drugabuse.gov). 177 Jonathan Zittrain,
a Harvard University law professor and co-author of the report,
commented that "[t]he minute you try to temper assistance with
evading censorship with judgments about how that power should be
used by citizens, you start down a path from which there's no clear
8
endpoint."17
IBB's anti-jamming software operates through Anonymizer,
discussed previously.' 7 9 The filtering list was implemented through
Anonymizer at the government's behest.' 8 0 The IBB argued that
such filtering is necessary because it is inappropriate for U.S. funding
to help citizens of Iran and China view pornography.' 8' However, the
list goes beyond blocking only pornography. A 2004 editorial article
commented that the IBB list "displays a conservative bias that labels
any Web address with 'gay' in them as verboten.' 18 2 Ken Berman,
who oversees the China and Iran Internet projects at IBB, called the
18 3
filtering "a trade-off we feel is a proper balance.'
The independent report was also critical of the IBB for not
choosing to use SSL encryption to scramble the browsing behavior of
Iranian citizens.18 4 However, the IBB responded that Iran doesn't
currently monitor the content of downloaded web pages.' 8 5 The IBB
does enable SSL encryption for Chinese citizens because the Chinese
18 6
government is known to monitor download content.
The U.S. government's own restrictions on Internet use are not
limited to pornography and sexual crime, but are also evident in the
anti-terrorism arena. GOFA condemns foreign governments'
monitoring of citizens' Internet activities, yet the PATRIOT Act of

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id.

184.
185.
186.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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2001 allows similar liberty curtailments in the United States. The
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has listed three concerns with
the PATRIOT Act: (1) expanded surveillance with reduced checks and
balances; (2) overbreadth with a lack of focus on terrorism; and (3)
allowing Americans to be more easily spied upon by U.S. foreign
18 7
intelligence agencies.
Regarding U.S. citizens' use of the Internet, EFF reads the
PATRIOT Act as allowing the government to "monitor the online
activities of innocent Americans, and perhaps even track what Web
sites you read, by merely telling a judge anywhere in the U.S. that
the spying could lead to information that is 'relevant' to an ongoing
criminal investigation.' ' 8 8 The person being "spied on does not have
to be the target of the investigation."'1 9 The application must be
granted, and the government is not required to report to the court or
the person spied upon what is done in the investigation. 190 EFF is
also concerned that the PATRIOT Act allows "nationwide roving
wiretaps" which effectively mean that the "FBI and CIA can now go
from phone to phone, computer to computer without demonstrating
that each is being used by a suspect or target of an order, or even
specifically identifying the person targeted."'191
The PATRIOT Act also resulted in changes regarding the
government's access to user information from ISPs. 192 It expands the
amount of information that ISPs may voluntarily give the
government absent a court order or subpoena. 193 It also expands the
information which the government may obtain with a simple
subpoena-which doesn't require court review-to "include records of
session times and durations, temporarily assigned network (I.P.)
addresses, and means and source of payments, including credit card
or bank account numbers."'1 94 All of these changes are further
strengthened by the PATRIOT Act's expanded definitions of
"terrorism. ' 195 EFF believes that the PATRIOT Act § 802's definition
of "domestic terrorism" could include legitimate domestic protest
96
activity. 1

187.
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., EFFAnalysis of the Provisionsof the USA
PATRIOT Act, Oct. 27, 2003, http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism/
20011031_eff_usa-patriot.analysis.php.
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Id.
189.
Id.
190.
Id.
191.
Id.
192.
Id.
193.
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Incidents like the arrests in China related to political Internet
activity, 1 97 and the coinciding fear of Chinese citizens regarding their
privacy from the government on the Internet, make a strong case for
international action to curb governmental Internet monitoring.
However, the brief discussion above regarding the U.S.'s own Internet
censorship and increasing limits on privacy shows that the unilateral
action proposed by GIFA essentially replaces other countries' limits
and values with those of the U.S. government. GIFA is written in
language connoting an Internet free of government censorship, but in
fact it proposes an Internet where the only government censoring is
the U.S. government; it replaces the Chinese firewall with its own.
E. U.S. Obscenity Law and the Community Standards Test
The hypocrisy of U.S. government funding of anti-jamming
technology is especially visible when viewed in relation to the United
States' domestic obscenity law. The "community standards" test is
generally used by U.S. courts to determine whether content is
obscene. 198 Some, including Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens,
have questioned the community standards test's applicability to the
Internet, because the test was originally intended to look at a specific
local community's standards. 199 However, the plurality opinion in
Ashcroft v. ACLU states that "[i]f a publisher chooses to send its
material into a particular community, this Court's jurisprudence
teaches that it is the publisher's responsibility to abide by that
community's standards. ' 20 0 The opinion goes on to state that "the
publisher's burden does not change simply because it decides to
distribute its material to every community in the Nation."2 0 '
If anti-jamming software were to be funded through GIFA or
GOFA, the U.S. government would continue to allow the most
restrictive standard within the U.S., the community standards test,
to govern; however, it would actively circumvent any more restrictive
standards applied internationally. Other countries could easily view
such a stance as a U.S. statement that it should be the sole judge of
what is acceptable Internet content globally. This stance may be
especially insulting to foreign governments if the U.S. funds
subversive technological measures to effectively impose U.S. norms.

197.
See Newbold, supra note 25, at 508.
198.
See generally Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (applying the
"community standards" test).
199.
Id. at 583.
200.
Id.
201.
Id.
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IV. THE SOLUTION: FACILITATING PRIVATE ACTION
The analysis above shows that while the U.S. government must
have some role in defeating Internet censorship, direct funding of
anti-jamming software, as explicitly called for by GIFA and likely to
occur under GOFA, is not the answer. The U.S. government should
facilitate private action to defeat Internet-jamming through (1)
allowing anonymization sites that are aimed at circumventing foreign
government censorship to operate with minimal U.S. government
involvement, and (2) attempting to minimize U.S. corporate
assistance in foreign governments' censorship of the Internet.
Before discussing these two actions in more detail, it is worth
summarizing why GIFA is not a good solution to the problem of
Internet censorship. The establishment of GIFT accomplished much
of the good that could come through GIFA. GIFT acknowledges that
non-censoring countries, including the U.S., need to take active steps
to break down Internet censorship, and it seeks a diplomatic,
20 2
multilateral approach.
As discussed above, the main addition of GIFA is the direct U.S.government funding of anti-jamming software. 20 3 This additional
funding coming from the U.S. government would likely have strings
attached, and could both alter the nature of the anti-jamming
services and reflect poorly on the U.S. government. 20 4 As the antijamming efforts can draw upon the general public through peer-topeer technology, less funding is needed. In addition, GIFA and GOFA
are worded broadly in regards to the use of the proposed funds, and
could amount to a blank check to be used in efforts that only
2
peripherally touch upon Internet censorship. 05
The likely strings attached to the funding of existing antijamming software under GIFA or GOFA would be in the form of
modifications-likely filtering, if not others-imposed on the services
by the government. This can only be assumed because it is not
explicitly written in the bills, but previous anti-jamming efforts that
have involved U.S. government funding have had filtering imposed,
as discussed above. 20 6 The U.S. government has expressed its fear of
opening up the Internet in China and other censoring countries to
allow pornography, 20 7 and this is not likely to change. What could
change would be the sophistication of the filtering techniques used so
as not to block as much legitimate, non-obscene content. However,
such modifications and development of better filtering software would
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207.
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be an example of funds going towards a goal that only peripherally
touches upon bringing down the censoring firewall. This money
would go towards allowing the U.S. government to censor on its own
terms, as opposed to removing censorship completely.
It is also worth noting here that although early private efforts at
anti-jamming software failed due to lack of funding, the current
private efforts have become more organized and powerful. 208 This
organization and strengthening can be seen in the December 2006
agreement between four of the largest companies involved in antijamming software. 20 9
These companies have expressed their
confidence in locating the necessary funding to keep their services
operational until China's firewall comes down. 210 At the same time,
the funding required to operate anti-jamming services is drastically
lowered as the services increasingly rely on public users' ability to
serve as nodes or hosts in peer-to-peer systems, thus shifting
bandwidth costs away from a central server.
This Note will now discuss the two prongs of the suggested
approach: (1) allowing anonymization websites to operate with
minimal U.S government involvement; and (2) attempting to
minimize U.S. corporate assistance of foreign governments'
censorship efforts.
A. Minimizing Government Involvement in Anti-Jamming Efforts
When the U.S. government has had a part in anti-jamming
technology in the past, it has tried to limit the software's use to users
of specific countries such as Iran or China. 211 The government could
have many reasons for this, including worries about citizens in noncensoring countries using the software for free as a way to shield
their online activity and thus wasting bandwidth, as opposed to using
the site for its intended function. Another reason the U.S.
government likely does not want such privacy services used by its
own citizens or by users in other specific countries is the resulting
increased difficulty in tracking terrorist activity.
The U.S. government needs to maintain a clear position on the
operation and use of anonymization sites in order to allow private
companies to know the level of services they may offer to foreign
users. The approach could fall short of allowing anonymization sites
to operate completely without regulation, and could include some sort
of government-imposed record-keeping in order to deal with worries
such as terrorism and child pornography. However, if such records
were accessible by the government under the lax requirements of the

208.
209.
210.
211.

See Milestone Agreement, supra note 68 (discussing private efforts).
Id.
See id. (discussing sources of funding).
See supra Part III.D.
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PATRIOT Act, the U.S. government would essentially give itself
access to the very type of personal information that would be denied
to other governments under GOFA.
If anonymization sites have explicit approval from the U.S.
government and are allowed to operate globally without significant
U.S. government-imposed restrictions, then the sites can likely gain
additional private funding. If such sites could be considered by U.S.
corporations as major gateways to the global Internet for users in
censoring countries like China, such anti-jamming sites could likely
seek funding through both imbedded advertisements and from large
websites such as Yahoo! and Google that are accessed through the
service. The latter would likely only come through a conjunction of
this proposed prong-explicit U.S. approval of anti-jamming sitesand the second prong, which would hopefully remove the censored
versions of Yahoo! and Google from China. This possibility will be
discussed further below.
B. Minimizing U.S. CorporateAssistance in Foreign Governments'
Censorship Efforts
An article written by Jill Newbold discusses various ways in
which the U.S. government could impose liability on U.S.
corporations for selling censorship tools to China. 2 12 She discusses
possibilities such as liability for human rights violations under the
Alien Tort Claims Act.2 13 While these options may be worth exploring
for blatant assistance of foreign censorship, such as providing
technology that has no use other than for censorship, they should not
be used against companies that merely provide a government with
general-purpose Internet technology that has the ability to filter. If
companies involved in the latter type of sales appear to be knowingly
assisting foreign censorship, it is increasingly likely that U.S.
investors will take notice as the publicity of Internet-censorship
issues continues to increase. 214 GOFA's proposed feasibility study on
the establishment of export license requirements for technology that
facilitates restrictions on Internet freedom is a good first step to raise
awareness of this issue.
Perhaps more important than preventing U.S. corporations from
supplying China with censorship technology is preventing large U.S.-
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based websites like Google and Yahoo! from offering censored
versions of their sites to Chinese users. The availability of these
censored sites lessens the demand within China for an uncensored
Internet by offering Chinese citizens something that may be "close
enough" to the global Internet, making it less likely that the firewall
will be broken from inside China.
Google and Yahoo! have expressed their desire for the U.S.
government to give them an excuse to not censor their sites for
China. 215
It is therefore probably not necessary for the U.S.
government to actually prosecute U.S. corporations that merely
comply with China's censorship requests. But the U.S. should put in
place legislation that companies like Google and Yahoo! can use as a
cover to force the Chinese government to a decision between global
search engine access and Internet censorship. GOFA does not seem
to be tailored to this purpose, but rather seems focused on preventing
companies from giving personal information to censoring
governments and creating transparency as to what content is
censored. While GOFA would create some cumbersome formalities
for companies such as Google and Yahoo! doing business in China,
the information obtained by the U.S. government regarding
censorship would help to raise public awareness of these companies'
decisions, which could further discourage offerings such as the selfcensored Google.cn.
If private anti-jamming efforts continue to grow and become
more sophisticated, and the censored versions of sites like Google and
Yahoo! are no longer offered, the Chinese firewall might be broken
from inside China through the demand of Chinese citizens and
government frustration in filtering efforts. If large anti-jamming
options were to emerge for Chinese users with no other access to
some major sites like the uncensored Google, sites like Google could
probably help to fund the anti-jamming technology by sharing
advertising dollars derived from Chinese viewers that would not have
been realized but for the Chinese citizens' use of anti-jamming
software. If the U.S. government is willing to take the suggested
approach and allow private corporations to operate anti-jamming
software free of government intervention, while also minimizing other
U.S. corporations' assistance of China on the other side, the U.S.
government funding of anti-jamming software proposed by GIFA and
GOFA would not be necessary.
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V. CONCLUSION

U.S. government funding of anti-jamming software is not a good
approach to defeating foreign governments' Internet censorship. The
U.S. government would be perceived internationally as imposing its
own standards of decency and morals onto China and other countries
with similar state-imposed Internet censorship. The U.S. government
should facilitate private action to defeat Internet-jamming by: (1)
allowing anonymization websites that are aimed at circumventing
government censorship to operate with minimal U.S. government
involvement; and (2) attempting to minimize U.S. corporate
assistance in foreign governments' censorship efforts. If the U.S.
allows anti-jamming software to operate free of government
intervention while also minimizing U.S. corporate assistance of
China, including pressuring the removal of self-censored versions of
popular sites like Google, there is a good chance that firewalls will be
broken from inside censoring countries through popular demand and
government frustration.
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